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Note
The Protective Scope of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act: Providing Mortgagors the
Protection They Deserve from Abusive
Foreclosure Practices
Eric M. Marshall*
One in every fifty-four households received a notice of fo-
reclosure in 2008.1 A record number of homes have entered fo-
reclosure in each of the first three quarters of 2009,2 and the
trend is expected to continue through at least 2010.3 An addi-
tional four million homeowners are delinquent on their mort-
gages and risk suffering the same fate.4 Adding insult to injury,
individuals are frequently subjected to excessive fees and other
abusive practices during the foreclosure process.5 Some mort-
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1. Les Christie, Foreclosures Up a Record 81% in 2008, CNNMO-
NEY.COM, Jan. 15, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/01/15/realestate/millionsin
foreclosurelindex.htm.
2. See U.S. Q3 Foreclosures Highest Ever, RECESSION.ORG, Oct. 15, 2009,
http://recession.org/news/q3-foreclosures-highest-ever; Karey Wutkowski, U.S.
Q2 Home Foreclosures, Mortgage Delinquencies Up, REUTERS, Sept. 30, 2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/ousivMolt/idUSN3020877720090930, KeepMy
House.com, http:I/www.keepmyhouse.com/2009/04/16/latest-foreclosure-statistics
-us-foreclosures-increase-by-9/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2010) (first-quarter statis-
tics).
3. See Les Christie, 4 Million Home Loans Are Delinquent, CNNMO-
NEY.coM, Aug. 20, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/08/20/real-estate/Mortgage
delinquencies-keep-rising/index.htm.
4. See id.
5. See Gretchen Morgenson, Panel to Look at Foreclosure Practices, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 29, 2008, at C3.
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gagors have fought back by challenging abusive foreclosure
practices under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA).6 However, courts are split on whether the protections
of the FDCPA extend to individuals facing foreclosure.7 With
the recent spike in foreclosures, it is likely that mortgagors will
increasingly seek protection under the FDCPA.8 Therefore, it is
essential that courts begin taking a unified approach to inter-
pretation of the FDCPA's protective scope.
This Note argues that the plain language of the FDCPA as
well as the Act's legislative history command an interpretation
under which the FDCPA applies to home mortgage foreclo-
sures. This interpretation would further the Act's broad goal of
protecting all consumers from abusive debt collection and re-
cognize that satisfaction of debt is a creditor's true objective in
foreclosure. The proposed interpretation looks beyond the
means used to accomplish debt collection, and in doing so pro-
vides mortgagors the protections they need and deserve.
Part I of this Note briefly describes the problematic defini-
tions of the FDCPA and the ensuing split among courts regard-
ing its proper application, and also explains the fundamental
concepts of mortgages and foreclosure. Part II analyzes the sta-
tutory language of the FDCPA and explains why the legislative
history of the Act commands an interpretation broadly protec-
tive of debtors. Additionally, it explores several arguments
made by litigants and courts and analyzes the security interest
clause. Finally, Part III concludes that mortgage foreclosure ac-
tivities must be covered by the FDCPA in order to give effect to
the Act's broad aim of protecting all consumers regardless of
the collection method employed.
6. See, e.g., Stanley v. Hollingsworth, No. 08-2453, 2009 WL 102125, at
*1 (7th Cir. Jan. 15, 2009); Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ul-
rich LPA, 538 F.3d 469, 471 (6th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S.Ct. 2863
(2009).
7. Compare Wilson v. Draper & Goldberg, P.L.L.C., 443 F.3d 373, 376-79
(4th Cir. 2006) (holding that foreclosure on a property pursuant to a deed of
trust is the collection of a debt), and Piper v. Portnoff Law Assocs., Ltd., 396
F.3d 227, 236 (3d Cir. 2005) (concluding that enforcing a security interest is
the collection of a debt), with Rosado v. Taylor, 324 F. Supp. 2d 917, 924 (N.D.
Ind. 2004) ("Security enforcement activities fall outside the scope of the
FDCPA because they aren't debt collection practices."), and Jordan v. Kent
Recovery Servs., Inc., 731 F. Supp. 652, 660 (D. Del. 1990) (construing the
FDCPA to hold that the enforcer of a security interest is not a debt collector).
8. Cf. Jonathan D. Glater, Financial Crisis Provides Fertile Ground for
Boom in Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2008, at B1 (noting the potential boom
in lawsuits related to fraud and the housing market).
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I. PROBLEMATIC TERMINOLOGY OF THE FDCPA
The FDCPA regulates debt collection but vaguely defines
what constitutes debt collection.9 This problematic terminology
has created disagreement among courts as to whether the fo-
reclosure of a home mortgage constitutes debt collection subject
to the requirements of the FDCPA.10
A. PROTECTIONS OF THE FDCPA
Congress passed the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act in
1977.11 The FDCPA forbids the use of deceptive, abusive, and
unfair practices by third-party debt collectors. 12 For example,
debt collectors are prohibited from communicating with a con-
sumer regarding the collection of a debt if the time of the com-
munication is inconvenient for the consumer, if the consumer is
represented by an attorney, or if the consumer informs the debt
collector that she refuses to pay the debt or that she does not
wish to be contacted in the future. 13 Debt collectors are also
prohibited from threatening violence or criminal acts against
the consumer, using obscene or abusive language,14 and mak-
ing false statements in an attempt to induce the consumer to
pay the debt.15 These and other restrictions are placed on debt
collectors for the purpose of eliminating abusive debt collection
practices, allowing nonabusive debt collectors to remain com-
petitive in the marketplace, and promoting consistent protec-
tion of debtors. 16
Under the FDCPA, liability attaches only to those who
meet the statutory definition of "debt collector,"17 which is de-
fined as "any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate
commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of
which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or
9. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a (2006) (defining "debt" and "debt collector").
10. Compare Wilson, 443 F.3d at 376-79 (concluding that property fore-
closure is debt collection), with Rosado, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 924 (holding that
security enforcement is not debt collection).
11. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874
(1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (2006)).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a).
13. Id. § 1692c.
14. See id. § 1692d.
15. See id. § 1692e.
16. See id. § 1692(e).
17. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Huntington Bank, 346 F.3d 693, 695 (6th Cir.
2003); Hulse v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1202 (D. Or.
2002).
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attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or
asserted to be owed or due another."'8 Six classes of individuals
and entities are expressly exempted from the definition of "debt
collector."' 9
The Act further provides that, for purposes of § 1692f(6),
the term "debt collector" "also includes any person who uses
any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any
business the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of
security interests." 2 0 Section 1692f prohibits debt collectors
from using "unfair or unconscionable means" to collect a debt
and provides eight, nonexhaustive examples of "unfair or un-
conscionable means."21 Specifically, § 1692f(6) prohibits threat-
ening dispossession of property when dispossession cannot le-
gally be effected.22
To determine whether a person is subject to the require-
ments of the FDCPA, one must first determine whether the
person is attempting to collect a debt.23 The FDCPA defines a
debt as "any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to
pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money,
property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the
transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household
purposes, whether or not such obligation has been reduced to
judgment."24
In recent years, many debtors have brought suit under the
FDCPA against individuals for their actions in foreclosing upon
a security interest.25 In response, foreclosing parties have ar-
gued that the enforcement of a security interest is not debt col-
lection, and therefore is not within the purview of the
FDCPA.26 Courts are split on this point of law.27
18. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).
19. See id. § 1692a(6)(A)-(F).
20. Id. § 1692a(6). I will refer to this clause of the FDCPA as the "security
interest clause."
21. Id. § 1692f.
22. See id. § 1692f (6).
23. See Piper v. Portnoff Law Assocs., Ltd., 396 F.3d 227, 232 (3d Cir.
2005).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).
25. See, e.g., Wilson v. Draper & Goldberg, P.L.L.C., 443 F.3d 373, 374
(4th Cir. 2006); Piper, 396 F.3d at 231-32; Hulse v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB,
195 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1202 (D. Or. 2002).
26. See, e.g., Wilson, 443 F.3d at 374; Piper, 396 F.3d at 231-32; Hulse,
195 F. Supp. 2d at 1202.
27. Compare Wilson, 443 F.3d at 376-78 (holding that foreclosure on a
property pursuant to a deed of trust is the collection of a debt), and Piper, 396
1272 [94:1269
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B. MORTGAGES AND THE FORECLOSURE PROCESS
A mortgage is the most commonly used residential real es-
tate security device. A standard residential mortgage is
straightforward. An individual borrows funds from a financial
institution, such as a bank, to purchase residential real proper-
ty.28 The purchaser (the mortgagor) then guarantees the debt
by granting the financial institution (the mortgagee) a security
interest in the purchased property.29 If a mortgagor defaults on
a mortgage, the creditor has the right to foreclose on the mort-
gagor's interest in the mortgaged real estate and force the sale
of the real estate to satisfy the secured debt.30 In most states,
there are two primary types of foreclosures: judicial foreclosure
and nonjudicial foreclosure. 31
When a debtor defaults on a mortgage, the creditor may in-
itiate judicial foreclosure by filing a lawsuit naming as defen-
dants the debtors and any other parties with an interest in the
secured property.32 After filing a complaint, the creditor pro-
vides notice of the pending foreclosure and litigation proceeds
as normal. 33 The facts in most foreclosure actions are
straightforward and rarely disputed: (1) a creditor loans a deb-
tor money, (2) the debtor grants the creditor a security interest
in real property, (3) the debtor defaults on the loan, and (4) the
debtor's default gives the creditor the right to accelerate the
loan and foreclose upon the secured property.34 Therefore, near-
ly all foreclosure actions are either unchallenged and result in
default judgment or are resolved on summary judgment.35 If
the creditor is entitled to foreclosure, the court issues a decree
of foreclosure that determines the amount of the debt and the
priority of all lien holders, orders a public auction of the se-
cured property, and details how the proceeds of the foreclosure
F.3d at 236, with Rosado v. Taylor, 324 F. Supp. 2d 917, 924 (N.D. Ind. 2004),
and Jordan v. Kent Recovery Servs., Inc., 731 F. Supp. 652, 660 (D. Del. 1990).
28. See GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE
LAW § 1.1 (4th ed. 2001) (discussing the basic mortgage transaction).
29. Id.
30. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 674 (8th ed. 2004) (citing EDWARD H. RA-
BIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN REAL PROPERTY LAW 1087 (1974)).
31. See Christopher A. Camardello, Understanding Foreclosure on Real
Property, BENCH & B. MINN., Oct. 2008, at 20, 21.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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sale will be distributed. 36 After the sale and confirmation of the
sale by the court, the sale proceeds are distributed to satisfy
the debts secured by the property.37
Nonjudicial foreclosure, also known as power-of-sale fore-
closure, is quite similar to judicial foreclosure but is generally
faster and less expensive because it does not require formal lit-
igation.38 In power-of-sale foreclosure, a creditor provides notice
of foreclosure to the debtor and publicizes the foreclosure sale.39
After providing notice and publication, the creditor may re-
quest a sheriff's sale of the secured property.40 Sale of the se-
cured property and distribution of the profits proceed in the
same manner as in judicial foreclosure.41
If the sale price of the foreclosed-upon property is less than
the secured debt, the debtor is generally liable to the creditor
for the difference in the form of a deficiency judgment.42 In
judicial foreclosure, deficiency judgments are generally
awarded automatically if the sale price is less than the out-
standing secured debt, as is nearly always the situation. 43 Defi-
ciency judgments are not automatically awarded in nonjudicial
foreclosure. 44 However, the mortgagee may seek a deficiency
judgment through separate litigation.45
Most states provide debtors a statutory right of redemption
which allows them to recover possession of the secured property
within a statutory period of time after the sale of the property
by paying the foreclosure sale price plus costs. 4 6 Essentially,
the debtor repurchases the property from the winning bidder at
the amount of the winning bid.47 Statutory redemption periods
vary by state and range from five weeks to two years.48 Most
36. See id. at 21-22.
37. See id. at 22, 24.
38. See Prentiss Cox, Foreclosure Reform Amid Mortgage Lending Tur-
moil: A Public Purpose Approach, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 683, 699-700 (2008).
39. See Camardello, supra note 31, at 22.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 28, § 8.1.
43. See id.
44. See id. § 8.3.
45. See id. § 8.1.
46. See id. § 8.4.
47. See Camardello, supra note 31, at 25.
48. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 28, § 8.4; Camardello, supra note
31, at 25.
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states allow the debtor to retain possession of the foreclosed
property for the duration of the redemption period. 49
Nearly all mortgages provide the mortgagee the right to
accelerate-call due-the entire debt, plus interest, within thir-
ty days of default.50 Acceleration allows the creditor to foreclose
upon the entire debt, including those payments not yet due. 51
Without an acceleration clause, the mortgagee would have to
foreclose on every monthly payment individually or wait until
the amortization period is complete to foreclose on the entire
debt-an approach that is impractical at best.5 2 Most mortgag-
es and many state foreclosure statutes provide debtors rein-
statement rights, which allow them to reverse acceleration and
reinstate the debt by paying the arrearage on the loan.5 3 Fur-
thermore, most mortgagees allow debtors to reinstate the loan
even when reinstatement rights are not expressly granted by
the mortgage or by statute.5 4
C. SEVERAL CIRCUIT COURTS HOLD THAT ENFORCEMENT OF A
SECURITY INTEREST Is DEBT COLLECTION UNDER THE FDCPA
Nearly all of the circuit courts that have addressed the ap-
plicability of the FDCPA to the enforcement of security inter-
ests have held that a person against whom a security interest is
enforced is entitled to the protections of the FDCPA.65 For ex-
ample, the plaintiff in Wilson v. Draper & Goldberg, P.L.L.C.
allegedly failed to make the mortgage payments on her home.56
In response, the creditor retained the defendant-law firm to fo-
reclose on the plaintiff's home.5 7 The plaintiff sued, alleging
that the defendant firm violated the FDCPA by failing to verify
49. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 28, § 8.4.
50. See Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The
Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399, 1462-64 (2004).
51. See id. at 1462.
52. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.1 cmt. a (1997)
(noting that without acceleration, the mortgagee would have to wait until the
end of the amortization period to foreclose).
53. See Cox, supra note 38, at 702.
54. See id.
55. See, e.g., Kaltenbach v. Richards, 464 F.3d 524, 529 (5th Cir. 2006);
Wilson v. Draper & Goldberg, P.L.L.C., 443 F.3d 373, 375 (4th Cir. 2006); Pi-
per v. Portnoff Law Assocs., Ltd., 396 F.3d 227, 229 (3d Cir. 2005); Romea v.
Heiberger & Assocs., 163 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 1998); Law Offices of David J.
Stern, P.A. v. Martinez (In re Martinez), 271 B.R. 696, 700 (S.D. Fla. 2001),
aff'd per curiam, 311 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2002).
56. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 374.
57. See id.
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the debt and engaging in prohibited communication with the
plaintiff.5 8 The Wilson defendants argued that the debt ceased
to be a debt once they initiated foreclosure because foreclosure
is "a termination of the debtor's equity of redemption relating
to the debtor's property," and therefore is distinct from "the en-
forcement of an obligation to pay money or a 'debt."' 59 The
Fourth Circuit refused to adopt this logic because it would
create "an enormous loophole," allowing creditors to avoid
FDCPA obligations by simply proceeding in rem rather than in
personam.60 The Wilson court noted the defendant's willingness
to terminate foreclosure proceedings if the plaintiff paid her
mortgage obligations supported its conclusion. 61
In Romea v. Heiberger & Associates, the Second Circuit re-
jected the argument that enforcement of a security interest is
not debt collection when the plaintiff-debtor can avoid enforce-
ment by paying the arrearage.62 The Second Circuit held that
the fact that the debtor may avoid enforcement of the security
interest through payment of the obligation has no effect on the
determination of whether the enforcement of a security interest
is debt collection. 63 The Third and Fifth Circuits have similarly
refused to deny FDCPA protections to debtors facing foreclo-
sure.64
Interpretation of the security interest clause is a critical
step in determining whether foreclosure is debt collection.65
Courts holding that enforcement of a security interest is debt
collection interpret § 1692a(6) of the FDCPA as an inclusive
clause.66 These courts find that the enforcer of a security inter-
58. See id. at 375.
59. Id. at 376.
60. Id. (citing Piper, 396 F.3d at 236).
61. Id.
62. See Romea v. Heiberger & Assocs., 163 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 1998)
(holding that the proceeding's purpose to collect back rent still qualified the
amount owed as debt).
63. See id.
64. Kaltenbach v. Richards, 464 F.3d 524, 529 (5th Cir. 2006); Piper, 396
F.3d at 229.
65. See Kaltenbach, 464 F.3d at 526-28 (engaging in statutory interpreta-
tion); Jordan v. Kent Recovery Servs., Inc., 731 F. Supp. 652, 657-58 (D. Del.
1990) (comparing the defendant's interpretation of the statute with the court's
final interpretation).
66. See Kaltenbach, 464 F.3d at 527-28 (finding that enforcing a security
interest is part of the general definition of debt collector); Wilson, 443 F.3d at
378 ("[I]t is an inclusion to the term debt collector."); Piper, 396 F.3d at 236
(endeavoring to not limit the definition of debt collector).
[94:12691276
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est who satisfies the definition of the security interest clause is
always subject to § 1692f(6) of the FDCPA.67 They further hold
that any enforcer of a security interest who also meets the gen-
eral definition of a debt collector is subject to the entire
FDCPA.68 Thus, these courts read the scope of the term "debt
collector" to be broader in the context of § 1692f(6) than in the
context of the FDCPA generally. 69 However, they do not view
these two definitions of "debt collector" as mutually exclusive.70
Courts that interpret the security interest clause as an in-
clusive clause assert that the inclusion of six explicit exceptions
to the definition of "debt collector" in the FDCPA supports their
interpretation.71 These courts argue that Congress's decision to
include the security interest clause within the inclusive lan-
guage of § 1692a(6), rather than listing it among the exceptions
to the definition of "debt collector," was an intentional decision
67. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 378 ("Thus, Defendants cannot benefit from
§ 1692a(6)(F)(i)'s exception to the definition of 'debt-collector' merely because
they were trustees foreclosing on a properly pursuant to a deed of trust."); Pi-
per, 396 F.3d at 236 ("[W]e believe it was intended to make clear that some
persons who would be without the scope of the general definition are to be in-
cluded where § 1692f (6) is concerned.").
68. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 378 ("Thus, if Defendants meet the statutory
definition of 'debt collector,' they can be covered by all sections of the Act, not
just § 1692f(6), regardless of whether they also enforce security interests.");
Piper, 396 F.3d at 236 (disagreeing with the idea that some are not subject to
the entire Act if they may not fall under the general definition of debt collec-
tor).
69. Wilson, 443 F.3d at 378 ("[The provision] does not exclude those who
enforce security interests but who also fall under the general definition of 'debt
collector."'); Piper, 396 F.3d at 236.
70. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 378; Piper, 396 F.3d at 236 (stating that some
debt collectors are not enforcing a security interest).
71. Piper, 396 F.3d at 236 ("The portion of § 1692a(6) upon which PLA re-
lies is not among the six listed exceptions to the general definition."); see Wil-
son, 443 F.3d at 378 ("[The provision] is not an exception to the definition of
debt collector."). Among those excluded from the definition of "debt collector"
under the FDCPA are "any person while serving or attempting to serve legal
process on any other person in connection with the judicial enforcement of any
debt" and
any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or
asserted to be owed or due another to the extent such activity (i) is in-
cidental to a bona fide fiduciary obligation or a bona fide escrow ar-
rangement; (ii) concerns a debt which was originated by such person;
(iii) concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was ob-
tained by such person; or (iv) concerns a debt obtained by such person
as a secured party in a commercial credit transaction involving the
creditor.
15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(D), (F) (2006).
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and must be given interpretive force. 72 Courts find further sup-
port for an inclusive interpretation of the security interest
clause in § 1692i(a)(1), 73 which requires debt collectors who
bring an action for enforcement of a security interest to bring
such action in the jurisdiction in which the property is lo-
cated.74 In Kaltenbach v. Richards, the court reasoned that con-
struing § 1692a(6) to mean that enforcers of security interests
are only subject to § 1692f(6) would render § 1692i(a)(1) mea-
ningless.75
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the agency charged
with enforcement of the FDCPA,76 also adopts an inclusive in-
terpretation of the security interest clause.77 Although the
FTC's interpretation is not binding on the courts or the Com-
mission,78 some courts have found the interpretation to be per-
suasive.79
D. SEVERAL DISTRICT COURTS HOLD THAT ENFORCEMENT OF A
SECURITY INTEREST IS NOT DEBT COLLECTION UNDER THE
FDCPA
Several district courts hold that enforcement of a security
interest is not subject to FDCPA requirements because it is not
debt collection.80 Many of these courts rely on the reasoning of
72. See Piper, 396 F.3d at 236 (finding that Congress meant to include the
security interest clause in the definition since it was not "among the six listed
exceptions"); see also Wilson, 443 F.3d at 378 (concluding that the provision is
not an exception).
73. See Kaltenbach v. Richards, 464 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir. 2006) (relying
on § 1692i(a)(1) and statutory interpretation to read the statute as a whole to
find that the definition of debt collector is only in § 1692f(6)); Piper, 396 F.3d
at 235 (stating that "§ 1692i of the Act provides that 'in the case of an action to
enforce an interest in real property securing the consumer's obligation,"' a debt
collector must bring the action to the district in which the real property is lo-
cated).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 1692i(a)(1) (2006).
75. Kaltenbach, 464 F.3d at 528; see also Piper, 396 F.3d at 235 (finding
that § 1692i shows that § 1692f(6) and § 1692a(6) do not conflict).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 16921(a) (2006).
77. See Statement of General Policy or Interpretation, Staff Commentary
on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 53 Fed. Reg. 50,097, 50,108 (Dec. 13,
1988) (stating that "debt collector" includes some security enforcers).
78. See id. at 50,101.
79. See, e.g., Kaltenbach, 464 F.3d at 528 (stating that the court "defer[s]
to the [FTC]'s construction").
80. See, e.g., Izenberg v. ETS Servs., LLC, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1199
(C.D. Cal. 2008) (finding that the lack of a claim that defendant is a debt col-
lector means there is no deficiency under the Act); Beadle v. Haughey, No.
Civ.04-272-SM, 2005 WL 300060, at *3 (D.N.H. Feb. 9, 2005) ("Security en-
2010] FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT
Jordan v. Kent Recovery Services, Inc. 81 to draw a distinction
between security interests and debt based on the debtor's abili-
ty to comply with a request for collection. 82 In Jordan, the court
examined the legislative history of the FDCPA and determined
that it was enacted to protect individuals who are unable-as
opposed to merely unwilling-to meet their financial obliga-
tions because of "an unforseen [sic] event such as unemploy-
ment, overextension, serious illness, or marital difficulties or
divorce."83 Thus, the court reasoned, a debtor owing a sum of
money may be unable to comply with a request for payment of
the debt, whereas a person asked to comply with the enforce-
ment of a security interest must simply surrender possession of
the property.84 Therefore, the court argued, individuals against
whom a security interest is enforced fall outside of the class of
people the FDCPA intended to protect and are not covered by
the Act. 86
Courts concluding that foreclosure on a mortgage is not
debt collection also rely on the reasoning of Beadle v. Haughey,
a New Hampshire case that found the distinction between judi-
cial and nonjudicial foreclosure determinative of whether fore-
closure is within the scope of the FDCPA.86 Based on this dis-
tinction, without detailing its reasoning, the court held that,
although judicial foreclosure may be covered by the FDCPA,
nonjudicial foreclosure is distinct from debt collection, and
therefore is not covered by the FDCPA.87
Another important factor in Beadle was to whom payment
could be made.88 The court found that where one can avoid fo-
forcement activities fall outside the scope of the FDCPA because they aren't
debt collection practices." (quoting Rosado v. Taylor, 324 F. Supp. 2d 917, 924
(N.D. Ind. 2004))).
81. Jordan v. Kent Recovery Servs., Inc., 731 F. Supp. 652, 654 (D. Del.
1990) (reasoning that there is a crucial difference between debt collectors and
securing an interest that needs to be considered when interpreting the
FDCPA).
82. See, e.g., Beadle, 2005 WL 300060, at *3 (relying on Jordan to show
that receiving debt collection letters does not agonize a person or require pro-
tection under the Act if the person is able to comply with the request); Jordan,
731 F. Supp. at 658 ("[The evil sought to be regulated by the FDCPA, i.e., ha-
rassing attempts . . . is not implicated by the actions of an enforcer of a securi-
ty interest with a 'present right' to the secured property.").
83. Jordan, 731 F. Supp. at 657.
84. See Rosado, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 925; Jordan, 731 F. Supp. at 658.
85. See Jordan, 731 F. Supp. at 658.
86. See Beadle, 2005 WL 300060, at *3.
87. Id. at *4.
88. See id. at *3.
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reclosure by paying the debt to the law firm enforcing the secu-
rity interest, the law firm's activities are considered debt collec-
tion.89 However, where one, as in Beadle, can avoid foreclosure
by paying the debt to the creditor, the law firm's activities are
not debt collection activities, and therefore are not subject to
the FDCPA.90
Courts holding that foreclosure actions cannot be chal-
lenged under the FDCPA view foreclosure and debt collection
as two distinct practices. 91 These courts argue that the FDCPA
is intended to protect consumers during the "collect[ion] of
funds from a debtor."92 Dissimilarly, foreclosure is an action by
the creditor to obtain possession of the secured property.93
These courts reason that foreclosure is not debt collection be-
cause possession rather than payment of funds is sought.94
Courts holding that the enforcement of a security interest
is not the collection of a debt construe the security interest
clause of § 1692a(6) as an exclusive clause.95 These courts read
the inclusion of enforcement of a security interest for the pur-
poses of § 1692f(6) to mean that enforcers of security interests
are not debt collectors for the purpose of any section other than
§ 1692f(6).96 They argue that the explicit inclusion of security
interest enforcement for the purposes of § 1692f(6) indicates
that Congress was aware of the distinction between debt collec-
tion and enforcement of security interests, and holding an en-
forcer of a security interest subject to the entire FDCPA would
render the security interest clause superfluous. 97
The Eighth Circuit recently sided with the district courts
in Jordan and Beadle.98 The Eighth Circuit refused to follow
89. See id. ("The key question here is not whether defendants' law firm is
a 'debt collector,' but rather, whether defendants were engaged in collecting a
debt.").
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., Hulse v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1204
(D. Or. 2002).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See id.
95. See, e.g., Beadle, 2005 WL 300060, at *2-3; Jordan v. Kent Recovery
Servs., Inc., 731 F. Supp. 652, 659 (D. Del. 1990) (stating that the clause is ex-
clusive to give it a purpose in the Act).
96. Beadle, 2005 WL 300060, at *3; Jordan, 731 F. Supp. at 659.
97. See Jordan, 731 F. Supp. at 659 (arguing that Congress's decision to
state that "debt collector" includes an "enforcer of a security interest" means
that it does not already fall within the definition of debt collector).
98. See Cohen v. Beachside Two-I Homeowners' Ass'n, No. Civ. 05-706
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the decisions of the Second, Third, and Eleventh Circuits and
held that foreclosure is a practice distinct from debt collection,
and therefore is not covered by the FDCPA.99 Meanwhile, the
district courts in circuits that have not yet interpreted the ap-
plicability of the FDCPA to foreclosure have also reached dis-
parate conclusions.100
With the recent spike in home foreclosures and the asto-
nishing foreclosure rates expected to persist, 101 consumers will
likely increasingly seek protection under the FDCPA. The un-
certainty created by the split among the courts regarding the
applicability of the FDCPA to foreclosures leaves consumers
without clearly defined rights and creates ambiguity as to at-
torneys' and collectors' legal obligations. The legal community
needs a unified interpretation of the FDCPA's scope to remove
this uncertainty and decrease litigation.
II. INTERPRETATION OF THE FDCPA
Principles of statutory interpretation, public policy, and
the legislative history of the FDCPA support a broad interpre-
tation of the Act inclusive of home mortgage foreclosure. Con-
gress intended the Act to provide consumers with expansive
protection from abusive debt collection practices, and the text of
the Act commands an interpretation consistent with that
goal. 102
A. PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE FDCPA
The FDCPA is clearly worded and provides broad coverage
of consumer obligations. 103 A threshold issue in determining
whether an individual is a debt collector when foreclosing on a
ADMJSM, 2005 WL 3088361, at *14 (D. Minn. Nov. 17, 2005), affrd, 272 Fed.
App'x 534 (8th Cir. 2008).
99. Id.
100. Compare Muldrow v. EMC Mortgage Corp., No. 08-1771 (RMU), 2009
WL 3069731, at *3-4 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2009) (holding that foreclosure activi-
ties must comply with the entire FDCPA), with Izenberg v. ETS Servs., LLC,
589 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1199 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (noting that foreclosure is not debt
collection under the FDCPA). Notably, California and Nevada account for ap-
proximately one-third of all foreclosures, KeepMyHouse.com, supra note 2,
and the Ninth Circuit has not yet defined the scope of the FDCPA.
101. See Renae Merle & Tomoeh Murakami Tse, Mortgage Foreclosures
Reach All-Time High, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2008, at Dl.
102. See Duffy v. Landberg, 133 F.3d 1120, 1123 (8th Cir. 1998) ("The
FDCPA is clearly worded and broadly defines debt as 'any obligation' to pay
arising out of a consumer transaction.").
103. Id.
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security interest is whether the consumer obligation at issue is
a debt.104 Therefore, the scope of "debt" determines, in part, the
scope of the term "debt collector." 05 The FDCPA broadly de-
fines a debt as "any obligation or alleged obligation of a con-
sumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the
money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of
the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household
purposes." 06 The word "any" demands a broad interpretation of
the terms to which it is attached.107 Thus, the FDCPA defini-
tion of "debt" should be interpreted to include all obligations
otherwise falling within the FDCPA definition, regardless of
whether the obligation is secured.
Similarly, the phrase "money, property, insurance, or ser-
vices" 108 connotes broad coverage of consumer transactions.
One is hard pressed to think of a transaction resulting in the
obligation to pay money, the subject of which is not property,
money, insurance, or services.109 At a minimum, the transac-
tion must merely involve the rendition of services or the pur-
chase of something of value.110 Furthermore, "any natural per-
son" is a consumer under the FDCPA.11 Based on these broad
definitions, nearly all consumer transactions-transactions
"primarily for personal, family, or household purposes,"112-
resulting in an obligation to pay money are debts under the
FDCPA.113 Therefore, a residential mortgage11 4 is a debt under
104. See Piper v. Portnoff Law Assocs., Ltd., 396 F.3d 227, 332 (3d Cir.
2005) ("The threshold requirement of the FDCPA is that the prohibited prac-
tices are used in an attempt to collect a 'debt."').
105. See id. at 332.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) (2006) (emphasis added).
107. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (interpreting
"any" in the case of a prison sentence statute).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).
109. Anything possessed, used, or enjoyed is "property," BLACK's LAW Dic-
TIONARY 1252 (8th ed. 2004), and the provision of "services" encompasses any
contribution to the welfare of others, WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY
1009-10 (1995).
110. See Staub v. Harris, 626 F.2d 275, 278 (3d Cir. 1980).
111. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3).
112. Id. § 1692a(5).
113. See id. § 1692a(5).
114. Although it is not always clear whether a transaction was undertaken
for commercial or consumer purposes, see, e.g., Bloom v. I.C. Sys., 972 F.2d
1067, 1068 (9th Cir. 1992) (describing how a loan made to a friend for an un-
disclosed purpose but ultimately used to invest in business equipment could
arguably have been made for either a commercial or consumer purpose), an
analysis of the factors relevant to this distinction are outside the scope of this
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the FDCPA because it is a transaction for the purchase of prop-
erty for personal or household purposes that obligates the
mortgagor to pay money.115
Defendants have argued that, even if the mortgage at issue
is a debt at origination, the secured debt ceases to be a debt
upon initiation of foreclosure. 116 However, the determination of
whether an obligation is a debt under the FDCPA is unaffected
by the methods later used to collect that debt.117 The only ques-
tion to be asked when determining if an obligation to pay mon-
ey is a debt under the FDCPA is whether the obligation arose
"out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance,
or services which were the subject of the transaction were pri-
marily for personal, family, or household purposes."118 The sta-
tute makes no mention of the continuing nature of the obliga-
tion. Therefore, a residential mortgage is a debt under the
FDCPA, and its classification as such is unaffected by its enfor-
ceability through foreclosure.
The FDCPA broadly defines a "debt collector" as any per-
son using any means of interstate commerce or the mail in any
business involved principally in the collection of any debt.119
Note. This Note assumes a clear distinction between commercial and consum-
er transactions and refers to mortgages undertaken for consumer purposes as
"residential mortgages" and those undertaken for commercial purposes as
"commercial mortgages."
115. See, e.g., Piper v. Portnoff Law Assocs., Ltd., 396 F.3d 227, 231-32,
234 (3d Cir. 2005). There are two primary types of mortgages: purchase-money
and non-purchase-money mortgages. A purchase-money mortgage is a mort-
gage securing the loan used to purchase the mortgaged real estate. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1033 (8th ed. 2004); NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 28, at
1. A non-purchase-money mortgage is a mortgage securing a debt incurred for
a purpose other than the purchase of the mortgaged real estate. Id. at 2. Ad-
mittedly, a residential non-purchase-money mortgage may secure a non-
consumer purchase. Id. However, courts do not disagree over the definition of
"debt" under the FDCPA; rather, it is interpretation of the term "debt collec-
tor" over which courts disagree. Therefore, this Note assumes that residential
mortgages are transactions for the purchase of property for personal or house-
hold purposes.
116. See, e.g., Wilson v. Draper & Goldbery, P.L.L.C., 443 F.3d 373, 374
(4th Cir. 2006); Piper, 396 F.3d at 231-32.
117. See Piper, 396 F.3d at 234 ("The fact that the [Pennsylvania Municipal
Claims and Tax Liens Act] provided a lien to secure the Pipers' debt does not
change its character as a debt or turn [defendant]'s communications to the Pi-
pers into something other than an effort to collect that debt."); Miller v.
McCalla, Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols, & Clark, L.L.C., 214 F.3d 872, 874-
75 (7th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the nature of an obligation is determined at
the time the obligation is undertaken).
118. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) (2006).
119. Id. § 1692a(6).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Any person who regularly attempts to collect debts directly or
indirectly is also a "debt collector" under the FDCPA, regard-
less of whether debt collection is the principal purpose of his
business or the business for which he works.120
Congress narrowed the FDCPA's broad definition of a "debt
collector" by providing six exceptions to the definition. 121 When
Congress has defined a term as clearly as it defined "debt col-
lector" in the FDCPA, courts should not read additional excep-
tions into the definition. 122 Unless an individual falls within
one of the narrow exceptions to the definition of a debt collec-
tor, the term "debt collector" should be given a broad mean-
ing.123 The enforcer of a security interest does not fall within
one of the six exceptions to the FDCPA definition of a debt col-
lector.124 Therefore, courts should give effect to the broad lan-
guage used by Congress by construing the Act's definition of a
debt collector to include enforcers of security interests.
B. LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF THE FDCPA
The FDCPA was intended to provide consumers broad pro-
tection from abusive debt collection practices.125 The goals of
the Act command an interpretation protective of consumers in
foreclosure.
1. Individuals Intended to Be Protected by the FDCPA
Many courts holding that foreclosure of a mortgage is out-
side the protective ambit of the FDCPA have relied, at least in
part, on Jordan's reasoning that the FDCPA is intended to pro-
tect individuals who are unable-as opposed to merely unwil-
ling-to meet their financial obligations because of "an unfor-
seen [sic] event such as unemployment, overextension, serious
illness, or marital difficulties or divorce."126 These courts be-
lieve mortgagors are capable of complying with a debt collec-
120. Id.
121. Id. § 1692a(6)(A)-(F).
122. See Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 708 (1995) (overruling
the lower court's overly broad interpretation of a well-defined statutory term).
123. See id. (holding that when Congress specifically defines a term, the
court should give effect to that language).
124. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(A)-(F) (describing Congress's reluctance to
limit the scope of the protection offered by the Act).
125. Duffy v. Landberg, 133 F.3d 1120, 1123 (8th Cir. 1998).
126. Jordan v. Kent Recovery Servs., Inc., 731 F. Supp. 652, 657 (D. Del.
1990) (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 3 (1977)); see also Rosado v. Taylor, 324
F. Supp. 2d 917, 924 -25 (N.D. Ind. 2004).
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tor's demands because, unlike a debtor who may not have the
money to pay a debt, a mortgagor facing foreclosure must simp-
ly turn over the secured property.127
Mortgagors are as likely as any consumer to be incapable
of meeting their financial obligations. In fact, due to the size
and duration of the financial obligation imposed by a mortgage,
it may be more likely that a mortgagor will be incapable of
meeting his financial obligation due to unforeseeable circum-
stances. In 2007, the average American mortgage payment was
$1464 per month,128 far greater than the amount of a typical
consumer debt, such as a retail purchasel 29 or utility billl30
both of which are undisputedly covered by the FDCPA.131 Fur-
thermore, unlike a one-time retail store purchase, mortgage ob-
ligations often continue for twenty to thirty years.132 Through
the FDCPA, Congress sought to protect consumers who were
unable to meet their financial obligations "due to an unforeseen
event such as unemployment, overextension, serious illness, or
marital difficulties or divorce." 33 Mortgagors nearly always cite
these same reasons for defaulting on their mortgage. 3 4
127. See Rosado, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 924-25; Jordan, 731 F. Supp. at 658.
128. American Community Survey, Mortgage Crisis and High Energy Costs
Reflected in Housing Stats, RES. ALERT, Oct. 3, 2008, at 1, 1.
129. CardTrak.com, Credit Card Transactions, Dec. 23, 2004, http://www
.cardweb.com/cardtrak/news/2004/december/23a.html (noting that the average
credit card purchase is approximately $100).
130. Todd Hymas Samkara, Stats on How Much Americans Pay for Essen-
tials, GRIST, Mar. 3, 2006, http://www.grist.org/article/costs1 (noting that the
average monthly electricity bill is about eighty dollars).
131. H.R. REP. No. 95-131, at 4 (1977) (defining debts as "consumer obliga-
tions paid by check or other non-credit consumer obligations").
132. Christopher Tarver Robertson et al., Get Sick, Get Out: The Medical
Causes of Home Mortgage Foreclosures, 18 HEALTH MATRIX 65, 84 n.87 (2008).
133. S. REP. No. 95-382, at 3 (1977).
134. According to Freddie Mac, forty-two percent of mortgagors cited un-
employment or reduced income as the reason for delinquent mortgage pay-
ments from 1999 to 2005. Preserving the American Dream: Predatory Lending
Practices and Home Foreclosures: Hearing on the Impact of Exotic Mortgage
Products on Homebuyers and Homeowners Before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing, & Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 130-31 (2007) (statement of Douglas
G. Duncan, Senior Vice President, Mortgage Bankers Association), available
at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-binlgetdoc.cgi?dbname=110_senatehearings
&docid-f:50309.pdf. Twenty-three percent cited illness or death in their family.
Id. Ten percent of delinquencies were due to excessive obligations of the mort-
gagor, eight percent because of marital difficulties, and three percent due to
extreme hardship. Id.
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Home ownership is often central to an individual's social
identity.135 Home ownership has also been shown to significant-
ly improve the academic and social development of children. 136
It is true that mortgagors have the ability to satisfy their debt
by surrendering their home; however, due to the social, famili-
al, and financial importance of a person's home, this option
should not be forced upon an individual without providing them
protection from deceptive and harassing debt collectors.
Other areas of the law provide special protections for home
ownership. 137 Foreclosure laws generally provide debtors with
the right of redemption 38 and prohibit the acceleration and fo-
reclosure of a mortgage for technical defaults or when the cred-
itor has exhibited a practice of allowing late payments.139 Addi-
tionally, filing for Chapter 13 bankruptcy stays a foreclosure
proceeding against the filer and gives the filer an opportunity
to propose a payment plan to cure the arrearage and retain
ownership of his or her home.140 All of these laws recognize the
potentially damaging effects of losing one's home.141 Therefore,
the FDCPA should not be interpreted as viewing the loss of
one's home as so insignificant of an event that homeowners are
not afforded the protections of the FDCPA.
Coverage by the FDCPA does not mean that a creditor or
collector may not foreclose upon the secured property; it merely
provides mortgagors the right to be free from false, deceptive,
135. See Cox, supra note 38, at 711 ("[A family] may be rooted in the house
where they are raising their children, the neighborhood where they have
found a sense of belonging, or a home they built."); Donald Haurin et al., The
Impact of Home Ownership on Child Outcomes 5 (Mar. 15, 2000) (unpublished
article), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=218969.
136. See Haurin et al., supra note 135, at 3 ("[O]wning a home compared
with renting leads to a higher quality home environment, the improvement
being 16 to 22 percent.").
137. See id. at 5 (outlining several benefits designed to encourage and pro-
tect home ownership).
138. Cox, supra note 38, at 701-02. Various state statutes grant mortga-
gors the right of redemption. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-248 (LexisNexis 2005);
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2903 (West Supp. 2010); MINN. STAT. § 580.23 (2008).
139. See, e.g., Browne v. Nowlin, 570 P.2d 1246, 1248-49 (Ariz. 1977) (hold-
ing that acceptance of a late payment cured default and prevented accelera-
tion); Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Taylor, 318 So. 2d 203, 207-08 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
140. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 1322(b)(5) (2006); Melissa B. Jacoby, Bankruptcy
Reform and Homeownership Risk, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 323, 327.
141. Cf. Vonk v. Dunn, 775 P.2d 1088, 1089-91 (Ariz. 1989) (holding that
equitable considerations apply to enforcement of acceleration clauses); Haurin
et al., supra note 135, at 5 (noting U.S. laws that encourage home ownership).
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and harassing actions during the foreclosure process. 142 Under
the FDCPA, a mortgagee or collector remains free to pursue fo-
reclosure or other methods of debt collection so long as they
comply with the requirements of the Act.143 Even if the mortga-
gor requests that the debt collector cease communication-a
request with which the collector must complyl 44-the mortga-
gee or collector may still pursue foreclosure in a judicial fo-
rum.145
Mortgagors also fall within the group of individuals in-
tended to be protected by the FDCPA because they are as sus-
ceptible to the abusive practices targeted by the Act as any con-
sumer facing debt collection. Congress enacted the FDCPA to
curb abusive collection practices such as "obscene or profane
language, threats of violence, telephone calls at unreasonable
hours, misrepresentations of a consumer's legal rights, [and]
disclosing a consumer's personal affairs."146 Mortgagors are
particularly susceptible to these types of abusive collection
practices because they rarely challenge foreclosure and instead
rely upon the information provided to them by their lender
without confirming the accuracy of the information. 147 The de-
trimental effect of losing one's homel 48 makes mortgagors par-
ticularly susceptible to coercive settlement practices. Because
of their susceptibility to abusive collection practices, mortga-
gors are at least as deserving of FDCPA protection as other
consumers.
142. Cf. Paulemon v. Tobin, 30 F.3d 307, 309 (2d Cir. 1994) (allowing the
creditor to pursue litigation against the debtor after he was required to termi-
nate all other communication with the debtor so long as the debtor was not
subjected to abusive or harassing conduct in violation of the FDCPA).
143. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c) (2006).
144. See id. (allowing a debt collector to notify the debtor that it intends to
invoke specific remedies).
145. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c)(1)-(3) (allowing communication invoking a
specified remedy even when all other communication must cease); 132 CONG.
REC. 30,842 (1986) (statement of Rep. Annunzio) ("[The Act] does not prevent
creditors, through their attorneys, from pursuing any legal remedies available
to them.") 123 CONG. REC. 10,246 (1977) (statement of Rep. Minish) ("The bill
does allow the collector to communicate with the consumer, at home and at
work, but within reason.").
146. S. REP. No. 95-382, at 2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695,
1696.
147. See Morgenson, supra note 5 (noting that a Senate subcommittee
planed to review mortgage lenders' debt collection practices).
148. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 38, at 711 (noting the emotional attachment
families feel toward their homes); Haurin et al., supra note 135, at 5-6 (de-
scribing the detrimental effects of home loss on children).
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2. Reasons for Enacting the FDCPA
Construing foreclosure as debt collection is consistent with
Congress's reasons for enacting the FDCPA. Congress passed
the FDCPA because it recognized the need to curb the effect
abusive debt collection practices have on "personal bankrupt-
cies," "marital instability," and job loSS.1 4 9 Abusive and decep-
tive practices in foreclosure also affect financial, job, and ma-
rital stability. Like the debt collection practices Congress
intended to address though the FDCPA, threatened foreclosure
contributes to personal bankruptcy.150 When faced with the
possibility of foreclosure, many homeowners file bankruptcy in
a last ditch effort to keep their home because filing for Chapter
13 bankruptcy automatically stops foreclosure sales and allows
the filer up to five years to correct delinquencies. 15 1
False and harassing conduct by debt collectors in mortgage
foreclosure is also connected to job insecurity. 152 Job loss paired
with the threat of foreclosure greatly enhances the bargaining
power of the creditor over the debtor in renegotiating the
loan, 53 thereby exacerbating the financial impact of threatened
foreclosure and the collector's ability to exploit the mortgagor.
Therefore, foreclosure must be considered debt collection in or-
der to achieve Congress's goal of eliminating job losses caused
by abusive debt collection practices.
Similarly, the risk of marital instability resulting from
mortgage foreclosure through false and harassing means is no
less severe than the risk of marital instability resulting from
the abusive collection of other consumer debts.154 In fact, the
risk of marital instability resulting from foreclosure is likely
greater than in the collection of other consumer debts because
the home, which is lost in foreclosure, and the community the
149. 15 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2006).
150. Susan Taylor Martin, A Chapter 13 Standoff, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
June 16, 2008, at Al.
151. See id. (describing the case of a woman who filed for bankruptcy eight
separate times in order to avoid losing her home).
152. See Tami Luhby, Foreclosures Soar 76% to Record 1.35 Million,
CNNMONEY.COM, Dec. 5, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/12/05/news/economy/
mortgage-delinquencies/index.htm (describing the link between recent increas-
es in unemployment and home foreclosures).
153. Charles M. Kahn & Abdullah Yava , The Economic Role of Foreclo-
sures, 8 J. REAL EST. FIN. & EcON. 35, 44 (1994) (explaining banks' power over
debtors' fear of job loss).
154. See Scott J. South & Glenna Spitze, Determinants of Divorce over the
Marital Life Course, 51 AM. Soc. REV. 583, 588-89 (1986) (finding that couples
who own their home are less likely to divorce).
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home is in are often central to the identity of the marriage and
the family unit. 155 Therefore, broad FDCPA protection is con-
sistent with Congress's goal of curbing the personal effects of
abusive debt collection.
3. Objectives of the FDCPA
Although Congress did not want to unnecessarily inhibit
the ability of ethical debt collectors to perform their jobs, it
found the regulations of the FDCPA to be justified by the fact
that debt collectors have alternative, nonabusive collection
practices at their disposal' 56 Similarly, foreclosure can be
achieved through nonabusive practices. It is particularly unne-
cessary to resort to abusive collection practices in the foreclo-
sure context because most states provide for summary proceed-
ings15 7 that allow the foreclosure process to occur three times
faster than traditional foreclosure.15 8 Thus, the FDCPA should
be interpreted as prohibiting the use of abusive foreclosure
practices because there is no need for collectors to resort to
such practices.
Congress also believed the FDCPA was needed to curb the
detrimental effect of abusive debt collection practices on inter-
state commerce. The recent foreclosure crisis demonstrates the
damaging impact foreclosures have on the national economy.159
The recent flood of foreclosures has depressed job creation and
decreased consumer spending. 60 Recent foreclosures are ex-
pected to lead to a $1.2 trillion decline in property values and
155. See Cox, supra note 38, at 711 (describing the attachment families feel
toward their home); South & Spitze, supra note 154, at 588-89 (noting the link
between home ownership and lower divorce rates).
156. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(c) (2006).
157. See G.E. Capital Mortgage Servs., Inc. v. Levenson, 657 A.2d 1170,
1178 (Md. 1995) ("Foreclosure pursuant to a power of sale is intended to be a
summary, in rem proceeding.").
158. Compare Levenson, 657 A.2d at 1178 (stating that sale of foreclosed
property can occur within twenty-one days of docketing when power of sale is
used), with Maryland Foreclosure Law Summary, http://stopforeclosure.com/
MarylandForeclosureLaw.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2009) (stating that a fo-
reclosure sale typically takes ninety days in Maryland).
159. See Merle & Murakami, supra note 101, (describing the impact of
home foreclosures on U.S. financial markets).
160. See Sue Kirchhoff, Foreclosures to Have 'Profound' Impact, Report
Warns, USA TODAY, Nov. 27, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/
housing/2007-11-27-foreclosuresN.htm (highlighting the impact of home fo-
reclosures on the job market and consumer spending).
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decrease tax revenues by billions of dollars.161 In light of the ex-
tensive impact that home foreclosures have on interstate com-
merce, the FDCPA should be interpreted to prohibit abusive fo-
reclosure practices in order to serve the FDCPA's goal of
curbing the effects of abusive debt collection on interstate
commerce.
Congress explicitly stated three principal purposes of the
FDCPA: (1) elimination of abusive debt collection practices, (2)
assuring that collectors who did not engage in abusive practices
were not competitively disadvantaged, and (3) promoting con-
sistent consumer protection laws among the states. 162 All three
of these purposes would be served by an interpretation of the
FDCPA that foreclosure constitutes debt collection. Abusive,
deceptive, and harassing practices are prevalent in home fore-
closures, 163 and mortgagors are no less susceptible to abusive
collection practices than other consumers. 164 Furthermore,
there is no reason to believe that firms engaging in nonabusive
foreclosure practices will face any less of a competitive disad-
vantage than nonabusive collectors of other consumer debts.
Consistent consumer protection is needed in the mortgage
and foreclosure industry. Mortgage lending and foreclosure is
increasingly being performed by national firms,165 but foreclo-
sure laws, fees, and procedures continue to vary by state.166
Therefore, consistent legislation prohibiting foreclosure firms
from engaging in abusive practices, such as threatening exces-
sive fees or use of procedures that are not actually available in
the foreclosure state, is needed to protect mortgagors. The cen-
tral focus of the FDCPA was to prevent the use of such practic-
161. Id. (noting the effects of foreclosure on the job market, property val-
ues, and tax revenues).
162. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2006).
163. See Morgenson, supra note 5 (noting a planned Senate investigation of
excessive fees assessed against mortgagors in foreclosure).
164. See supra Part II.B.1.
165. See Ann M. Burkhart, Lenders and Land, 64 MO. L. REV. 249, 281-82
(1999) (noting the reasons for national regulation of the mortgage market and
why regulation makes historical sense); Cox, supra note 38, at 743-44 (noting
the increasingly national nature of real estate finance and the resulting need
for national regulation).
166. See Cox, supra note 38, at 686, 702 (noting that state laws differ re-
garding redemption periods and reinstatement rights); see also Tara Twomey,
Deciphering Mortgage Proofs of Claim, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Nov. 2008, at 1,
53-54 ("Foreclosure costs and fees also vary depending on whether a state is a
judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure state and on state law itself.").
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es against debtors,167 and therefore, mortgagors facing foreclo-
sure are within the class of individuals in need of the protec-
tions of the Act. 168
The President touted the FDCPA as a comprehensive con-
sumer protection act intended to replace prior scattered con-
sumer protection regulations with a single, consistent protec-
tive regulation that would reduce the effort and cost of
consumer protection. 169 An interpretation that would require
additional legislation in order to provide mortgagors the protec-
tions they need-the same protections provided to other con-
sumers under the FDCPA-rather than include them within
the protective ambit of the FDCPA runs contrary to the Act's
goal of providing a single, uniform law protective of all consum-
ers in debt collection.
4. Legislative History of the FDCPA
The legislative history of the FDCPA supports protection of
mortgagors from abusive foreclosure practices. Congress be-
lieved that several people and situations are not within the
scope of the term "debt collector." "[T]he collection of debts,
such as mortgages and student loans, by persons who origi-
nated such loans," is not debt collection.170 Therefore, Congress
implied that the collection of mortgages by persons other than
the originator is debt collection under the FDCPA by not in-
cluding mortgage debt collection among the exceptions to "debt
collector," and interpretive force should be given to Congress's
implication.171
Congress also stated that "mortgage service companies" are
not debt collectors "so long as the debts were not in default
167. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (outlining the goals of the FDCPA).
168. See 123 CONG. REC. 28,112 (1977) (statement of Rep. Annunzio) (stat-
ing that the FDCPA is intended to "assure that every individual, whether or
not he actually owes a debt, is treated in a reasonable manner by debt collec-
tors"); Morgenson, supra note 5, at C3 (noting excessive fees assessed against
mortgagors in foreclosure and deceptive actions taken by mortgage lenders
and foreclosure firms).
169. See Consumer Protection Act Amendments: Remarks on Signing H.R.
5294 into Law, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1628-29 (Sept. 20, 1977).
170. S. REP. No. 95-382, at 4 (1977) (emphasis added).
171. Cf. El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 487 (1999)
(stating that expression of one thing suggests the exclusion of others); Andrus
v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616 (1980) (holding that when Congress
explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional
exceptions are not to be implied in the absence of evidence of a contrary legis-
lative intent).
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when taken for servicing."172 The FDCPA exempts the collec-
tion of any debt from the definition of "debt collector" if the debt
"was not in default at the time it was obtained by such per-
son."173 Thus, Congress saw no distinction between collecting
on mortgages and collecting other debts covered by the FDCPA.
Like any other debt, when mortgages are in default at the time
they are assumed by a collector, collection on that mortgage is
debt collection under the FDCPA, and all activity in connection
with the collection must comply with the Act.174
Nondebtors contacted or harassed because of mistaken
identity are a key group of individuals Congress intended the
FDCPA to protect.175 To those not owing any debt it is irrele-
vant whether the improper collection is attempted through fo-
reclosure or by demanding the payment of money. It is even
more imperative that nondebtors be protected by the Act in the
foreclosure context because of the extensive impact threatened
foreclosure can have on financial and familial stability. 7 6 Indi-
viduals not actually owing a debt need and deserve the protec-
tion of the FDCPA regardless of the method of attempted col-
lection, and therefore, the FDCPA's regulations should apply to
foreclosures.
C. ARGUMENTS OF COURTS AND LITIGANTS OPPOSED TO
APPLICATION OF THE FDCPA To FORECLOSURES
Courts and litigants in favor of the inapplicability of the
FDCPA to foreclosures have advanced faulty arguments in
support of their position.
1. Effect of Delinquency Payments
In Beadle, a New Hampshire court held that a law firm's
activities are considered debt collection when foreclosure can be
avoided by payment of the debt to the law firm enforcing the
security interest, but similar activities are not debt collection
when foreclosure can be avoided by payment of the debt to the
172. S. REP. No. 95-382, at 4-5 (1977).
173. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii) (2006).
174. Id.
175. See, e.g., 123 CONG. REC. 10,241 (1977) (statement of Rep. Annunzio)
("[E]very individual, whether or not he owes a debt, has the right to be treated
in a reasonable and civil manner [during debt collection].").
176. See Cox, supra note 38, at 711; South & Spitze, supra note 154, at
588-89.
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creditor.177 However, this distinction was improper because a
settlement offer is necessarily an attempt to collect on the debt.
Even if foreclosure were not debt collection, when foreclo-
sure can be avoided by paying the arrearage, the collector's ac-
tions necessarily become debt collection. Once the enforcer of
the security interest offers to cease foreclosure actions if the
debtor pays the delinquent debt, the enforcer is demanding, al-
beit as one of two alternatives, the payment of money. A de-
mand for the payment of money is clearly within the FDCPA's
definition of debt collection.178
This interpretation of the FDCPA is necessary regardless
of to whom payment is to be made. The FDCPA focuses on pro-
tection of the debtor.179 To a debtor, it is irrelevant to whom the
debt must be paid; rather, the debtor is only concerned with
whether payment must be made. A debt collector is likely to
seek collection with equal fervor regardless of to whom pay-
ment is to be made because collectors are often paid based on
the amount they recover.180 Therefore, a debtor needs the same
protections from abusive practices regardless of whether pay-
ment to the collector or the creditor is being sought.
Furthermore, contrary to the argument of the Romea de-
fendant, offering the debtor the opportunity to avoid foreclosure
by making delinquent payments does not remove foreclosure
from the protective ambit of the FDCPA.181 A debt collector
must cease communications with a debtor once the debtor re-
fuses to pay the debt or requests that the collector cease com-
munication.182 However, a statutory exception allows a debt col-
lector to continue to communicate with the debtor in order to
notify the debtor that the creditor or collector may invoke a
specified remedy.183 A settlement offer constitutes a specified
remedy, and therefore, notifying a debtor that further collection
efforts will be terminated upon payment of the debt is expressly
177. Beadle v. Haughey, No. Civ.04-272-SM, 2005 WL 300060, at *3
(D.N.H. Feb. 9, 2005).
178. See, e.g., Walcker v. SN Commercial, LLC, 286 F. App'x 455, 457 (9th
Cir. 2008).
179. See, e.g., King v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 452 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1281-
82 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
180, Neighborhood Economic Development Advocacy Project, Inc., Nego-
tiating with Debt Collectors, http://www.nedap.org/hotline/dcnegotiating.html
(last visited Mar. 13, 2010).
181. Romea v. Heiberger & Assocs., 163 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 1998).
182. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c) (2006).
183. Id. § 1692c(c)(2).
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exempted from the requirements of § 1692c(c).184 If settlement
offers were not covered by the FDCPA generally, there would
have been no reason for Congress to exempt them from the re-
quirements of § 1692c(c). 185 Therefore, because the FDCPA ex-
pressly exempts settlement offers from the requirements of
§ 1692c(c), settlement offers must comply with all sections oth-
er than § 1692c(c). 186
The FTC has supported a similar view, concluding that
communication with a debtor regarding options for resolving
debts in order to avoid foreclosure must comply with the re-
quirements of §§ 1692e and 1692g. 187 Sections 1692e and 1692g
both apply only to debt collectors. 188 Therefore, the FTC pre-
sumably considers a person initiating foreclosure to be a debt
collector under the FDCPA, regardless of whether foreclosure
can be avoided through payment of the debt.
Interpreting the Act such that a settlement offer that al-
lows a debtor to avoid foreclosure does not fall within the speci-
fied remedy exception to § 1692c(c) would force creditors to
pursue collection through litigation once the debtor has refused
to pay the debt. Forcing collectors to resort to litigation once a
debtor has refused to pay the debt, even though a settlement
offer may be successful, needlessly increases litigation costs. 8 9
But the FDCPA was touted as cost-saving legislation. 190 In or-
der to give effect to the cost-reduction goals of the FDCPA, set-
tlement offers must fall within the specified remedy exception
to § 1692c(c).
184. Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., 135 F.3d 389, 398-99 (6th Cir. 1998).
185. Cf. O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 86-87 (1994) (stating
that the expression of one thing suggests the exclusion of the other); Jett v.
Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 730-31 (1989) (same).
186. Cf. O'Melveny & Myers, 512 U.S. at 86-87; Jett, 491 U.S. at 730-31.
187. See Letter from Donald S. Clark, Secretary, Fed. Trade Comm'n, to
Barbara A. Sinsley & Manuel H. Newburger, Barron, Newburger, Sinsley &
Wier, P.L.L.C. (Mar. 19, 2008), available at http://www.fte.gov/os/2008/03/
PO84801fdcpa.pdf (concluding that a debt collector does not commit a per se
violation of § 1692e or § 1692g by communicating settlement options to the
debtor, but a violation can arise if the communication is deceptive).
188. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (2006) (detailing actions that cannot be taken by
debt collectors); id. § 1692g (requiring that debt collectors validate debts with-
in five days); see also Romea v. Heiberger & Assocs., 163 F.3d 111, 116-17 (2d
Cir. 1998).
189. Lewis, 135 F.3d at 399.
190. See, e.g., Consumer Protection Act Amendments: Remarks on Signing
H.R. 5294 Into Law, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1628, 1628 (Sept. 20, 1977).
1294 [94:1269
2010] FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT
Like a settlement offer, foreclosure is also a specific remedy
falling within the exception to § 1692c(c), and therefore is cov-
ered by the remainder of the FDCPA. In fact, the Cohen court
itself recognized foreclosure as a specified remedy falling with-
in the exception to § 1692c(c). 191 However, the court failed to
consider the implication of its finding. If the specific remedy of
foreclosure were not debt collection, there would be no reason
to exempt the specific remedy of foreclosure from the require-
ments of § 1692c. 192 Therefore, foreclosure activities must be
covered by all sections of the FDCPA other than § 1692c.
2. Distinction Between Demanding the Payment of Money and
Enforcing a Property Interest
Most courts that hold the FDCPA inapplicable to foreclo-
sures draw a sharp distinction between foreclosure and an at-
tempt to collect money in satisfaction of a debt. 193 Although col-
lection of money is clearly debt collection within the purview of
the FDCPA, these courts frame foreclosure as an action enforc-
ing a property interest held by the creditor, rather than the en-
forcement of an obligation to pay money.194 In so construing fo-
reclosure, these courts ignore the Act's focus on the debt rather
than the collection method, fail to give proper credence to Con-
gress's intent, and do not consider foreclosure laws' focus on sa-
tisfaction of the underlying debt.
a. The FDCPA's Focus on the Underlying Debt
Applicability of the FDCPA depends upon the character of
the underlying debt, not the collection method used to enforce
191. Cohen v. Beachside Two-I Homeowners' Ass'n, No. Civ. 05-
706ADMJSM, 2005 WL 3088361, at *14 (D. Minn. Nov. 17, 2005), aff'd, 272 F.
App'x 534 (8th Cir. 2008).
192. Cf. O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 86-87 (1994) (stating
that the expression of one thing suggests the exclusion of the other); Jett v.
Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 730-31 (1989) (same).
193. See, e.g., Hulse v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1204
(D. Or. 2002) ("Payment of funds is not the object of the foreclosure action. Ra-
ther, the lender is foreclosing its interest in the property."); Heinemann v. Jim
Walter Homes, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 716, 722 (N.D. W. Va. 1998) ("Since the
trustees were not collecting on the debt at that time but merely foreclosing on
the property pursuant to the deed of trust, these activities do not fall within
the terms of the FDCPA."), aff'd, 173 F.3d 850 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Beadle
v. Haughey, No. Civ.04 -272-SM, 2005 WL 300060, at *3 (D.N.H. Feb. 9, 2005)
(exempting collection activities from debt collection when foreclosure can be
avoided).
194. See, e.g., Hulse, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 1204; Heinemann, 47 F. Supp. 2d
at 722; see also Beadle, 2005 WL 300060, at *3.
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the debt.195 The method of enforcement used is irrelevant. 96
Rather, the decisive factor is whether the debt being collected is
one that is covered by the FDCPA.197 Several courts and the
FTC have endorsed this view.198 A residential mortgage is
clearly a debt.199 Therefore, any actions taken for the purpose
of satisfying that debt are covered by the FDCPA, regardless of
whether the method used seeks the direct payment of money.
The FDCPA focuses on protecting debtors from deceptive
and abusive collection practices. 200 Debtors are equally, if not
more, susceptible to such practices in foreclosure proceedings
than they are when collectors demand the payment of mon-
ey. 201 This is particularly true for those individuals who do not
actually owe a debt-a key group of individuals Congress in-
tended the FDCPA to protect.202 Therefore, courts should not
draw needless distinctions based upon the method of debt col-
lection, but rather give credence to the FDCPA's intent to pro-
tect debtors regardless of the collection method used and in-
terpret foreclosure as debt collection.203
195. Cf. Sheehan v. Mellon Bank, Civ. A. No. 95-2969, 1995 WL 549018, at
*2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 1995) (holding foreclosure against personal property se-
curing a commercial debt is not covered by the FDCPA because commercial
debt is not debt under the Act); Ranck v. Fulton Bank, No. Civ. A. No. 93-1512,
1994 WL 37744, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 1994), aff'd, 40 F.3d 1241 (3rd Cir.
1994) (holding that actions of a debt collector executing upon personal items
are not debt collection if the underlying debt was not undertaken for personal,
familial, or residential purposes).
196. Cf. Sheehan, 1995 WL 549018, at *2; Ranck, 1994 WL 37744, at *3.
197. Cf. Sheehan, 1995 WL 549018, at *2; Ranck, 1994 WL 37744, at *3.
198. See, e.g., Sheehan, 1995 WL 549018, at *2; Ranck, 1994 WL 37744, at
*3; Letter from Roger J. Fitzpatrick, Attorney, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Div. of
Credit Practices, to Christopher J. Hall, Attorney, Thompson, McNaboe, Ash-
ley & Bull (Apr. 11, 1988), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/fdcpal
letters/hall.htm.
199. See supra Part II.A.
200. See, e.g., Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 454 (3d Cir. 2006)
(quoting Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318 (2d Cir. 1993)) (giving effect
to the "basic purpose of the FDCPA: . . . to protect 'all consumers, the gullible
as well as the shrewd"').
201. See supra Part II.B.1.
202. See 123 CONG. REC. 28,112 (1977) (statement of Rep. Annunzio) (stat-
ing that the FDCPA is intended to "assure that every individual, whether or
not he actually owes a debt, is treated in a reasonable manner by debt collec-
tors").
203. Cf. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111 (2001) (inter-
preting the Federal Arbitration Act to "give effect to [the statute's] purpose").
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b. Objective of Foreclosure and Demands for Payment
Courts finding the FDCPA inapplicable to foreclosure view
the goal of foreclosure as perfection of a property interest ra-
ther than the collection of money.204 However, a creditor's true
objective in foreclosure is satisfaction of the underlying debt,
not obtaining possession of the secured property. This objective
is evidenced by the availability of deficiency judgments, the
right of redemption, and the requirement of debt acceleration.
With the exception of strict foreclosure-a rarely used form
of foreclosure in which the title to secured property transfers
directly to the creditor 205-foreclosed property is sold at public
sale, and the proceeds from the sale are then applied to the
outstanding debt. 206 Thus, like any debt collection, the payment
of money is the ultimate result of foreclosure. In foreclosure
there merely happens to be an additional step required to ob-
tain that payment, namely, sale of the secured property. Re-
gardless, the ultimate result of foreclosure is that the debtor's
obligation is satisfied through the payment of money.207
The right of redemption, available in most states, further
indicates that the objective of foreclosure is satisfaction of the
secured debt. If the objective of foreclosure were to foreclose a
property interest rather than satisfy a debt, presumably credi-
tors would not be expected to later give up that property inter-
est. The right of redemption is similar to a statutorily imposed
settlement offer. Because a settlement offer brings the foreclo-
sure action within the purview of the FDCPA, foreclosure must
necessarily be covered by the FDCPA when there is a statutory
right to recover. 208
If the foreclosure sale of secured property does not satisfy
the outstanding debt, the creditor is entitled to a deficiency
judgment. 209 A deficiency judgment entitles the creditor to fur-
ther recover the amount of debt not offset by the proceeds of the
foreclosure sale.210 Therefore, the law clearly views foreclosure
204. See, e.g., Hulse v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1204
(D. Or. 2002).
205. See, e.g., Cook v. Glover, 22 F. Supp. 531, 531 (E.D. Ill. 1938); Rabbit
v. First Nat'l Bank, 237 Ill. App. 289, 290 (2d Dist. 1925).
206. Camardello, supra note 31, at 20, 22.
207. See Cox, supra note 38, at 702-03 (stating that either foreclosure sale
proceeds satisfy the secured debt or a deficiency judgment is rendered for the
remaining portion).
208. See supra Part II.C.1.
209. See Cox, supra note 38, at 702-03.
210. Id.
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as at least partial satisfaction of the underlying debt. When a
party initiates foreclosure, it is seeking satisfaction of a debt.
When satisfaction of a debt is sought, actions related thereto
must comply with the FDCPA regardless of the method used.211
Therefore, foreclosure activities must be within the purview of
the FDCPA.
It is particularly difficult to parse foreclosure from collec-
tion of the underlying debt in light of the fact that the debt
must be accelerated in order to foreclose on the entire debt.212
The acceleration requirement allows the creditor to terminate
its relationship with the debtor as to the debt in default. 213
Therefore, it seems clear that the central purpose of foreclosure
is to allow the creditor to recover its debt. Because the central
objective of foreclosure is satisfaction of the underlying debt,
foreclosure must be debt collection under the FDCPA.
D. INTERPRETATION OF THE SECURITY INTEREST CLAUSE
Interpretation of the security interest clause is crucial to
interpretation of the FDCPA. The structure of the FDCPA, the
structure of the security interest clause, and the inclusion of§ 1692i(a)(1) support the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits' in-
clusive interpretation of the security interest clause.
1. "Debt Collector" Under § 1692f(6)
The Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits correctly interpret
the FDCPA as providing a broader definition of the term "debt
collector" in the context § 1692f(6) than in other sections of the
Act. 2 14 Such a dual interpretation of the term "debt collector" is
justified for two reasons.
211. Cf. Wilson v. Draper & Goldberg, P.L.L.C., 443 F.3d 373, 376 (4th Cir.
2006) (disfavoring interpretations of the FDCPA that allow creditors to escape
FDCPA coverage by collecting a debt through one procedure rather than
another procedure that would clearly be covered by the Act when both proce-
dures accomplish the same ends).
212. See 12 U.S.C. § 3706(a)(4) (2006); see also In re S & H Assocs. Ltd.
P'ship, No. 07-00399, 2008 WL 5063851, at *3 (Bankr. D.D.C. Nov. 19, 2008);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.1 (1997).
213. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.1 cmt. a (1997)
(noting that without acceleration, the debtor/creditor relationship would have
to continue through the end of the amortization period).
214. See Kaltenbach v. Richards, 464 F.3d 524, 527-28 (5th Cir. 2006); Wil-
son, 443 F.3d at 378; Piper v. Portnoff Law Assocs., 396 F.3d 227, 236 (3d Cir.
2005) (concluding that an individual could be a debt collector within the con-
text of § 1692f(6) without being a debt collector in the context of the FDCPA
generally but not vice versa).
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First, unlike the general definition of a debt collector, the
security interest clause does not require the existence of a debt
as defined by the FDCPA, namely a consumer debt.215 Congress
could have easily written the security interest clause to pertain
to the enforcement of an interest securing a debt, but instead,
Congress chose to speak of security interests generally. There-
fore, an appropriate interpretation of the security interest
clause is that the enforcement of a security interest is covered
by the entire FDCPA so long as it arises out of a debt, as de-
fined by the Act, and otherwise satisfies the general definition
of debt collection. Additionally, enforcement of any security in-
terest is covered by § 1692f(6), regardless of whether that in-
terest arises out of a debt, as defined by the Act.2 1 6 Under such
an interpretation, foreclosure on a residential mortgage would
be subject to the entire FDCPA, including § 1692f(6), but a
commercial mortgage would only be covered by § 1692f(6).217
This interpretation is more reasonable than an exclusive inter-
pretation that denies debtors facing foreclosure the right to be
treated respectfully and honestly.
Second, a broader definition of "debt collector" under the
security interest clause than under the FDCPA generally is jus-
tified by the definition of "debt collector." The FDCPA generally
defines a debt collector as "any person who uses any instru-
mentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business
the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or
who regularly collects or attempts to collect . .. debts." 2 18 Not-
withstanding this definition, § 1692f(6) applies to "any person
who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the
mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the en-
forcement of security interest."219 Therefore, an individual en-
forcing a security interest whose business's primary purpose is
215. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2006).
216. Cf. Kaltenbach, 464 F.3d at 529 ("Whether a debt collector's specific
action qualifies as the collection of a debt may or may not be relevant when
determining whether the party must comply with other, specific substantive
requirements of the FDCPA . . . .").
217. See Sheehan v. Mellon Bank, No. Civ. A. 95-2969, 1995 WL 549018, at
*2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 1995); Ranck v. Fulton Bank, No. Civ. A. No. 93-1512,
1994 WL 37744, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 1994), aff'd 40 F.3d 1241 (3rd Cir.
1994); Letter from Roger J. Fitzpatrick, Attorney, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Div. of
Credit Practices, to Christopher J. Hall, Attorney, Thompson, McNaboe, Ash.
ley & Bull (Apr. 11, 1988), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/fdcpal
letters/hall.htm.
218. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).
219. Id.
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to enforce security interests must comply with the provisions of
§ 1692f(6), regardless of the frequency with which she collects
debts. Additionally, she is subject to the remainder of the
FDCPA if she regularly collects or attempts to collect debts.220
Therefore, it is appropriate to interpret "debt collector" under
the security interest clause as broader than, and not mutually
exclusive from, "debt collector" under the FDCPA generally.
2. Effect of § 1692i(a)(1)
An inclusive interpretation of the security interest clause is
necessary to give effect to § 1692i(a)(1) of the FDCPA. Section
1692i(a)(1) requires an action to enforce a security interest in
real property to be brought in the district where the secured
property is located. 221 An exclusive interpretation requiring en-
forcement of a security interest to comply only with the re-
quirements of § 1692f(6) would render § 1692i(a)(1) meaning-
less.22 2 Courts must avoid statutory interpretations that render
sections of a statute meaningless, 223 and therefore, the text and
structure of the FDCPA require an inclusive interpretation of
the security interest clause.
Courts interpreting the security interest clause as exclu-
sive have avoided this anomaly by interpreting § 1692i(a)(1) as
nothing more than a venue requirement. 224 However, in light of
the FDCPA's focus on debtor protection, it is more reasonable
to interpret § 1692i(a)(1) as an attempt by Congress to prevent
creditors from pursuing foreclosure in distant forums, for the
purpose of coercing individuals into paying their debt to avoid
the costs of distant litigation.
3. Structure of the Security Interest Clause
If Congress intended enforcers of security interests not to
be debt collectors for purposes of all sections of the FDCPA oth-
er than § 1692f(6), it easily could have included the security in-
220. See id.; Muldrow v. EMC Mortgage Corp., No. 08-1771, 2009 WL
3069731, at *3-4 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2009).
221. 15 U.S.C. § 1692i(a)(1) (2006).
222. See Kaltenbach v. Richards, 464 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir. 2006); see also
Piper v. Portnoff Law Assocs, 396 F.3d 227, 235 (3d Cir. 2005).
223. See Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988) (Scalia, J., plu-
rality opinion); South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498,
510 n.22 (1986) ("It is an 'elementary canon of construction that a statute
should be interpreted so as not to render one part inoperative."').
224. Beadle v. Haughey, No. Civ.04-272-SM, 2005 WL 300060, at *4
(D.N.H. Feb. 9, 2005).
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terest clause within the list of individuals exempted from the
definition of "debt collector."225 Instead, Congress chose to in-
clude the security interest clause within the inclusive language
of § 1692a(6). Courts should respect the placement of the secu-
rity interest clause and interpret it as an inclusive clause.226
Individuals expressly exempted from the term "debt collec-
tor" are excluded for purposes of every section of the FDCPA.227
Therefore, it is plausible that Congress chose not to include the
security interest clause within the list of exceptions to the term
"debt collector" because enforcers of security interests were not
intended to be excluded from the definition of that term for
purposes of every section of the Act. However, if this were the
true intent of Congress, it could have expressed that intent by
merely inserting the word only into the security interest clause
so that it would read, "[flor the purpose of section 1692f(6) of
this title only, such term also includes any person who uses any
instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any
business the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of
security interests." Congress chose not to include any restric-
tive or exclusive language, such as the word only, 2 2 8 and there-
fore, the security interest clause should be interpreted as an in-
clusive clause.
III. FDCPA PROTECTIONS SHOULD APPLY TO
HOMEOWNERS FACING FORECLOSURE
Courts should uniformly interpret the FDCPA as applica-
ble in its entirety to residential mortgage foreclosure activities.
This approach is consistent with the FDCPA's plain language
and its broad goal of providing uniform legislation protective of
all consumers. 229 The language and goals of the FDCPA suggest
that courts should not draw distinctions based on the technical
225. Cf. El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 487 (1999)
(stating that expression of one thing suggests the exclusion of others); Andrus
v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 608 (1980) (holding that when Congress
explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional
exceptions are not to be implied).
226. See Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 695 (1995) (discouraging
courts from reading exceptions into statutes that Congress did not itself in-
clude in the statutory text).
227. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(A)-(F) (2006).
228. See id.
229. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2006); Consumer Protection Act Amend-
ments: Remarks on Signing H.R. 5294 Into Law, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1628, 1628
(Sept. 20, 1977).
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form of the collection method, but rather look to whether the
challenged practice was intended to satisfy a debt. Such an ap-
proach is consistent with the text, structure, and goals of the
FDCPA.230 Mortgagors need the protections of the FDCPA re-
gardless of the collection method used. Therefore, courts should
give effect to the broad language of the Act and uniformly hold
that residential foreclosure activities must comply with the
FDCPA.
By focusing on whether satisfaction of a debt is being
sought, courts can shift the focus away from the nature of the
collection method to the debtor's need for protection. Mortga-
gors are a prime example of the type of consumer in need of
protection from deceptive and harassing collection practices,
particularly during the current foreclosure crisis.231 Foreclosure
is often extremely damaging to homeowners' personal, family,
and financial lives. Although foreclosure is an all-too-common
reality of current economic times, the difficulties foreclosure
imposes on individuals should not be compounded by the ac-
tions of unscrupulous debt collectors. Rather, courts should en-
sure that homeowners are afforded the protections of the
FDCPA by uniformly interpreting the Act as applicable to resi-
dential mortgage foreclosures.
CONCLUSION
As foreclosure rates continue to rise, mortgagors will likely
increasingly seek protection from abusive foreclosure practices
under the FDCPA. Therefore, it is imperative that courts begin
to take a unified approach to interpretation of that Act. The
language and structure of the FDCPA command coverage of fo-
reclosure activities. Additionally, mortgagors facing the chal-
lenges of foreclosure are precisely the type of individuals in-
tended to be protected by the FDCPA from harassing and
abusive practices by debt collectors. Therefore, courts should
uniformly hold that foreclosure activities must comply with the
entire FDCPA.
230. See, e.g., Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 454 (3d Cir. 2006).
231. Morgenson, supra note 5.
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